And, Mr. Ambassador, we’re grateful for your service and grateful

for your testimony today.

I wanted to raise primarily two issues, maybe three, but the first

one centers on China. I was noting in a pertinent part of your

statement, that you said China has an important role to play in

influencing the path that North Korea follows. You spoke of your

trip and that China shared a ‘‘deep concern about North Korea’s recent

actions.’’ Our challenge now is to work with China to turn this

commitment into effective implementation of the various Security

Council resolutions.

I was going to ask you about Resolution 1718 passed in October

2006 and the enforcement thereof.

Since Resolution 1718 passed, as you know—and we can easily

track this—China’s aid, trade, and investment in North Korea has

expanded.

How can the Obama administration, and you’re playing a central

role in this, encourage China to enforce U.N. sanctions and take a

more assertive posture toward North Korea? Any thoughts on that?

Anything that you would recommend? I know

you’re not in this business of recommending what Congress should

do, but any suggestions about how Congress can be helpful on that

narrow question of the enforcement of that resolution?

That’s OK for today.

Well, let’s move on. I wanted to move to the

question of the six-party talks.

What’s your sense of the likelihood of the six-party talks being

reengaged in the near term (a) and then (b) if you’d comment on—

I know in the statement, you talked about this—that it was helpful

for us to have a four-pronged strategy. The fourth prong being if

North Korea shows a serious willingness for diplomatic engagement.

How do you see that playing out or how would you like it to play

out in terms of the role that any further or near-term six-party

talks reengagement would take on as well as any kind of bilateral

strategy?

Right. And getting back to a question Senator Cardin

raised about the selling or exporting of technology that relates to

nuclear weapons, do you have any sense—I know we all have a

concern, that’s obvious—that the North Koreans at this moment

are engaged in any kind of a strategy to sell that technology?

Do you think it’s mostly about what they’re doing internally?

Fair enough. Finally, I know I have a minute

left, I’ll be real brief on this, the North Koreans, recently announced

that they’ve suspended the 1953 armistice that ended the

Korean war.

Is there any practical effect to that? What—how do you see that?

Thank you very much.